The need for flexible service provision in electric power systems has dramatically increased due to the growing penetration of variable energy resources, as has the need to ensure fair access and compensation for this provision. A swing contract (SC) facilitates flexible service provision because it permits multiple service attributes to be offered together in bundled form with each attribute expressed as a range of possible values rather than as a single point value. This paper discusses a new SC Market Design for electric power systems that permits SCs to be offered by any dispatchable resource. An analytical optimization formulation is developed for the clearing of an SC day-ahead market that can be implemented using any standard mixed integer linear programming (MILP) solver. The practical feasibility of the optimization formulation is demonstrated by means of a numerical example.
Introduction
The increased penetration of variable energy resources in electric power markets has increased the volatility of net load (i.e., load minus non-dispatchable generation) as well as the frequency of strong ramp events. Variable energy resources (VERs) are renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar power, whose generation cannot be closely controlled to match changes in load or to meet other system requirements.
Left unresolved in this previous conceptual work, however, is whether the determination of optimal market-clearing solutions for SCs can be reduced to a routine operation suitable for real-world application. The present study provides an affirmative answer to this question for a general SC day-ahead market design permitting swing contracts to be offered by any dispatchable resource. 1 Section 2 presents and motivates an illustrative form of SC permitting the flexible provision of power and reserve services in electric power markets. The basic operational features of existing U.S. day-ahead and real-time market designs are outlined in Section 3. Section 4 discusses in broad terms a new market design for the support of SC trading, with a particular focus on a centrally-managed SC day-ahead market design that permits SCs to be offered by any dispatchable resource. Key distinctions between this SC day-ahead market design and existing U.S. day-ahead market designs are highlighted.
Section 5 then presents a new optimization formulation for the market clearing of SCs in the SC day-ahead market. This formulation constitutes a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem that can be solved by means of the same MILP solution software currently in use for standard security-constrained unit commitment optimization formulations [6, 14, 20, 24] . A numerical example is provided in Section 6 to demonstrate the practical feasibility of this new optimization formulation.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 7. A nomenclature table listing symbols and symbol definitions is provided in an appendix. 4 
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An Illustrative Swing Contract in Firm Form
Four types of contracts are proposed in [15] to facilitate power and reserve trading: namely, firm contracts and option contracts taking either a fixed or swing form. A firm contract (FC) imposes specific obligations on the buyer and seller regarding how the buyer will procure services from the seller in accordance with contractually specified terms. In contrast, an option contract (OC) gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to procure services from the seller in accordance with contractually specified terms. The right can be activated by exercise of the OC at a contractually permitted exercise time, at which point the contractual terms of the OC become firm.
An FC or OC is a fixed contract if each of its offered services is expressed as a single value. An FC or OC is a swing contract (SC) if at least one of its offered services is expressed as a set of possible values, thus permitting some degree of flexibility in its implementation.
For concreteness, this study focuses on SCs in firm form that offer a particular spectrum of services expressed in time-domain terms. 2 The form of these SCs is as follows:
b = location where service delivery is to occur; t s = power delivery start time;
t e = power delivery end time; P = [P min , P max ] = range of power levels p;
= range of down/up ramp rates r; φ = Performance payment method for real-time services.
In (1), the location b would typically refer to a bus or node of a transmission grid. The times t s and t e denote specific calendar times expressed at the granularity of time periods of length ∆t (e.g., 1 hour, 1 minute), with t s < t e . The power interval bounds P min ≤ P max can represent pure power injections (if 0 ≤ P min ), pure power withdrawals or absorptions (if P max ≤ 0), or bi-directional power capabilities (if P min ≤ 0 ≤ P max ). The down/up limits −R D and R U for the ramp rates r (MW/∆t) are assumed to satisfy −R D ≤ 0 ≤ R U .
The location b, the start time t s , and the end time t e are all specified as single values in (1). However, the power levels p and the down/up ramp rates r are specified in swing form with associated ranges P and R.
The performance payment method φ designates the mode of ex post compensation to be paid to the seller of the SC if this seller is called upon to provide actual services. This performance payment method can take a wide variety of forms.
For example, φ could be a flat-rate price ($/MWh) to be applied to the total amount of energy (MWh) injected into the grid between t s and t e . Alternatively, φ could specify that the price ($/MWh) to be paid for power (MW) injected into the grid between t s and t e is contingent on the realization of some future event, such as the spot price of fuel between t s and t e . Also, φ might include a metric for the compensation of ramping, such as some form of "mileage" metric based on the length of any delivered down/up power path. 3 In addition, φ could include penalty or incentive payments to encourage accurate following of dispatch instructions between t s and t e , thus permitting a market-based determination of these payments. 4 To understand the obligations of the seller and buyer of an SC (1), should it be cleared, a numerical example might be helpful. Consider the following SC offered for sale in an ISO-managed day-ahead market by a market participant m in return for a requested availability price α = $100, 5 where ∆t = 1 hour.
t e = 10:00am;
This SC implies that market participant m is offering to provide power at bus b from 8:00am to 10:00am on the following day. The power levels at which m is willing to be dispatched range from 10MW to 40MW, but the required down/up ramp rates r to achieve these power levels must satisfy -38MW/h ≤ r ≤ 28MW/h. The performance payment method φ designates that m is to be paid the price φ =$35/MWh for each MWh of energy it delivers under this SC.
Suppose the ISO announces that this SC has been cleared. The seller m is then immediately entitled to receive its availability price α = $100. In return for this payment, m is "committed" for next-day operations in the following sense: m is obligated to ensure it will be available to perform the services promised in its cleared SC if called upon to do so in next-day operations between 8:00am and 10:00am. In turn, the ISO is obligated to ensure that m is compensated fully, ex post, for any such service performance, in accordance with m's performance payment method φ . Figure 1 depicts one possible power path that the ISO could dispatch in real-time operations, in accordance with the terms of this SC. The darker (green) area under this power path is the resulting energy (MWh) delivery, to be compensated ex post at the rate of $35/MWh. It is the responsibility of market participant m to ensure it is able to fulfill the terms of this offered SC. Two aspects must be considered: physical feasibility; and financial feasibility. With regard to physical feasibility, the power delivery start time t s =8:00am must precede the power delivery end time t e =10:00am, which is clearly the case. In addition, [t e −t s ] = 2h must be at least as great as m's minimum up time. 6 With regard to financial feasibility, market participant m should make sure that all of its "avoidable costs" are covered. Avoidable costs are costs that can be avoided if an activity is not undertaken but that are incurred if it is undertaken.
Specifically, market participant m should make sure that its offered availability price α = $100 covers all of the avoidable costs that m would have to pay in order to guarantee service availability. Also, m should make sure that its offered performance payment price φ = $35/MWh is sufficient to cover all avoidable costs that m would have to pay if called upon to perform actual services. Examples of avoidable service availability costs include avoidable unit commitment (UC) costs, such as start-up/shut-down and no-load costs, as well as lost-opportunity costs arising from m's inability to receive revenues for its services in a next-best alternative use. Examples of avoidable service performance costs include avoidable costs for fuel and labor time. 7 3 Existing U.S. Wholesale Power Market Designs
As depicted in Fig. 2 , seven U.S. energy regions (CAISO, ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM, SPP) encompassing over 60% of U.S. generation capacity currently have centrally-managed wholesale power markets. 7 Although specific market rules differ across these seven energy regions, particularly with regard to reserve procurement, their basic operational design can be roughly summarized as follows. Private Generation Companies (GenCos) sell bulk power to other private companies called Load-Serving Entities (LSEs), who in turn resell this power to retail customers. The transactions between the GenCos and LSEs take place within a wholesale power market consisting of a Day-Ahead Market (DAM) and a Real-Time Market (RTM), operating in parallel, which are centrally managed by an Independent System Operator (ISO) or Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Day-ahead generation schedules are determined in the DAM based on estimated next-day net loads. Any discrepancies that arise between DAM generation schedules for nextday operations and actual next-day needs for generation based on actual next-day net loads are handled in the RTM, which thus functions as a real-time balancing mechanism. 8 
Wanning Li and Leigh Tesfatsion
The physical power flows underlying these transactions take place by means of a high-voltage transmission grid that remains centrally managed by the ISO/RTO in order to ensure open access at reasonable access rates. Transmission grid congestion is managed in the DAM and RTM by Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP). 9 During the morning of each day d the GenCos and LSEs submit into the DAM a collection of power supply offers and power demand bids, respectively, for all 24 hours h of day d+1. Given these offers and bids, the ISO/RTO solves SecurityConstrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) and Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) optimization problems subject to standard system constraints 10 in order to determine the following planned outcomes at each transmission grid bus b for each hour h of day d+1: (i) GenCo unit commitments; (ii) scheduled dispatch levels (MW) for committed GenCos; and (iii) a locational marginal price
) for each MW of power it is scheduled to inject at b during hour h of day d+1, and an LSE must pay π DAM (b, h, d) for each MW of power its retail customers are scheduled to withdraw at bus b during hour h of day d+1.
The ISO/RTO undertakes an RTM SCED optimization at least once every five minutes during each day d. At the start of an RTM SCED on any day d, immediately prior to some operating period t, the ISO/RTO forecasts the net load for t. The ISO/RTO then conducts the RTM SCED optimization to resolve any discrepancies between the dispatch schedule determined in the day-(d-1) DAM for t on day d and the ISO/RTO's current forecasted net load for t on day d. Any dispatch adjustment and/or load curtailment needed to ensure load balancing at a particular bus b for operating period t on day d is settled at the LMP determined for bus b in the RTM SCED optimization conducted for operating period t on day d.
For later purposes, four key features of this existing wholesale power market design need to be stressed. First, the design does not provide for the coverage of UC costs through market-based processes. Rather, start-up/shut-down, no-load, and other forms of UC costs incurred by GenCos are compensated by various forms of out-of-market (OOM) payments, generally referred to as uplift payments.
Second, DAM/RTM settlements (including uplift payments) do not carefully distinguish between avoidable costs and unavoidable (sunk) costs. All of the avoidable costs incurred by DAM/RTM market participants due to their fulfillment of DAM/RTM service obligations should be compensated through DAM/RTM settlements. However, the unavoidable costs of these participants -i.e., the costs they the load (power demands) of its retail customers. An ISO/RTO is an organization charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining the security of an electric power system and often with system operation responsibilities as well. The ISO/RTO is required to be independent, meaning it cannot have a conflict of interest in carrying out these responsibilities, such as an ownership stake in generation or transmission facilities within the power system. 9 LMP is the pricing of electric power according to the timing and location of its withdrawal from, or injection into, an electric power grid. 10 These system constraints include: power balance constraints; line and generation capacity limits; down/up ramping restrictions; minimum down/up-time requirements, and reserve requirements.
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Third, settlement obligations for scheduled next-day service performance are incurred in the DAM in advance of actual service performance. These DAM settlement obligations are based on DAM net load estimates formed from LSE demand bids and from ISO/RTO forecasts for next-day non-dispatchable generation. Thus, subsequent RTM dispatch and settlement adjustments are typically needed in order to balance actual next-day net loads. Having multiple points in time (DAM, RTM) at which settlement obligations are incurred for the same operating period increases the chance that market inefficiency (deadweight loss) will arise.
Fourth, considered together, the above three features result in extremely complex market rules. This, in turn, opens up opportunities for market gaming.
The SC DAM Design: Overview
As discussed in [15, 22] , swing contract (SC) trading can be supported by a sequence of linked centrally-managed forward markets whose planning horizons range from years to minutes. Forward markets with very long planning horizons can be used to encourage new capacity investment while forward markets with very short planning horizons can be used to correct last-minute imbalances between available generation and forecasted real-time net loads.
In this study, for concreteness, we demonstrate how an ISO-managed SC DAM can be designed that permits SC trading by the set M of all market participants with dispatchable resources. The entities in M can include GenCos, demand response resources (DRRs), 11 electric storage devices (ESDs), and dispatchable variable energy resources (VERs). Additional market participants include non-dispatchable VERs and LSEs with fixed (must-serve) loads.
To retain the ISO's non-profit status, all costs incurred by the ISO for SC procurement must be passed through to market participants. This cost pass-through could simply require all procurement costs to be allocated to the LSEs in proportion to their share of real-time loads. However, the presence of performance payment methods φ in offered SCs permits more sophisticated cost-sharing arrangements. For example, reserve requirement costs could arise in part due to the inability of some resources with cleared SCs to follow dispatch instructions with high accuracy. The ISO could require standardized failure-to-perform penalties to be included in the performance payment methods of SCs to help defray these costs. Figure 3 provides a summary comparison of our proposed SC DAM design to current DAM designs. The basic features characterizing current DAM designs are explained in Section 3. To understand the similarities and differences highlighted in Fig. 3 , it is important to recall the key attributes of SCs discussed in Section 2. These key attributes are summarized below.
(i) The swing in the contractual terms of SCs permits these contracts to function as both power and reserve products. This eliminates the need to provide separate pricing and settlement processes for power versus reserve services. (ii) The two-part pricing of SCs permits full separate market-based compensation for service availability and service performance. The availability price of an SC permits the seller to be compensated for all avoidable costs associated with service availability, while the performance payment method included among the terms of an SC permits the seller to be compensated ex post for all avoidable costs arising from actual real-time service provision. (iii) SCs require sellers to internally manage unit commitment and generation capacity constraints for their resources. By offering an SC into an SC DAM, a seller is communicating to the ISO in charge of this SC DAM that it can feasibly perform the services represented in the SC if called upon to do so. (iv) The performance payment method φ included among the contractual terms of an SC can designate special incentives and/or penalties to assure the ISO that the seller of the SC will fulfill the terms of the SC if the SC is cleared.
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5 The SC DAM Design: Analytical Formulation
SC DAM Analytical Formulation: Summary Description
As discussed in Section 3, current DAM designs rely on standard SCUC/SCED optimizations to determine unit commitment, economic dispatch, and pricing solutions. In a sharp break from this practice, we propose a new analytical optimization formulation for the SC DAM that permits the optimal clearing of SCs. 
SC DAM Analytical Formulation: Equations
Consider an ISO-managed SC DAM to be optimally cleared over a set T = {1, . . . , T } of successive next-day operating periods t with length ∆t. For clarity of exposition, five assumptions are made.
First, it is assumed that all loads serviced by the LSEs are fixed (must-serve) loads that do not provide dispatchable services. Second, it is assumed that LSE demand bids have a simple block-energy form, i.e., an LSE's demand bid for any given period t consists of a power demand (MW) that is not responsive to price. Third, it is assumed that each market participant m with dispatchable resources, i.e., each m ∈ M, offers a single swing contract SC m into the SC DAM, where SC m takes form (1). 12 Fourth, it is assumed that the performance payment method φ m appearing within SC m takes the form of a collection of flat-rate energy prices φ m (t) ($/MW∆t), one price for each t ∈ T. Fifth, it is assumed that only system-wide down/up spinning reserve requirements are imposed; contingency reserve requirements for generator or line outages are not considered. 13 Given these simplifications, the objective of the ISO managing the SC DAM reduces to the minimization of total cost ($) over T subject to system constraints. Total cost is the summation of SC availability cost plus expected performance cost arising from the need to balance expected net loads {NL b (t) : b ∈ B,t ∈ T} as determined by LSE demand bids and ISO-forecasted generation from non-dispatchable VERs. Total cost is expressible as follows: 14
The ISO minimizes (2) by appropriate selection of the following ISO decision variables:
• Market participant contract clearing indicators: c m ∈ {0, 1}, ∀m ∈ M
• Market participant power dispatch levels: p m (t), ∀m ∈ M, t ∈ T
• Bus voltage angles:
The system constraints for the minimization of (2) are as follows:
ISO decision variable bounds:
12 See [15] for a discussion of the more general case in which offers can take the form of portfolios consisting of multiple SCs. 13 As discussed in [15] , option SCs seem to be a more suitable vehicle than firm SCs for handling contingency reserve requirements. 14 See the appendix nomenclature table for definitions of all terms appearing in the following equations. Although power levels p m (t) for all market participants m ∈ M nominally appear in the objective function (2), it will be seen below that the constraints for this SC DAM optimization formulation restrict the power amounts for market participants with non-cleared SCs to be zero.
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Unit commitment constraints:
Voltage angle specification at angle reference bus 1:
Line power transmission constraints:
Power balance constraints at each bus:
Market participant capacity constraints:
Market participant down/up ramp constraints:
System-wide down/up spinning reserve requirement constraints:
More Detailed Explanations of Key Terms
The absolute value terms |p m (t)| appear in the objective function (2) because a market participant m with dispatchable resources might be called upon to provide power curtailments p m (t) < 0 as well as power injections p m (t) > 0 in support of period-t net load balancing requirements. The power curtailments provided by m are assumed to be compensated at the same flat rate φ m (t) as m's power injections. 15 The contract clearing indicator c m ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether SC m has been cleared (1) or not (0). The offer service indicator A m (t) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether time period t is (1) or is not (0) within the contract service times covered by SC m .
Note that A m (t) is a derived value, calculated by the ISO from the information provided within SC m . Consider, for example, the numerical SC example presented in Section 2. In this example, a market participant m submits an SC consisting of an offer to provide service between 8:00am and 10:00am during the following day. Thus:
if t = 1, . . . , 7, 10, . . . , 24
As seen in Section 5.2, the unit commitment constraints take the form
The unit commitment v m (t) ∈ {0, 1} for each market participant m ∈ M in each time period t is thus determined by two factors:
(a) Has SC m been cleared by the ISO or not? (b) Does SC m include service for time period t or not?
The contract clearing indicator c m ∈ {0, 1} represents condition (a), and the offer service indicator A m (t) ∈ {0, 1} represents condition (b). If conditions (a) and (b) are both met, then m is available to provide service in time period t. Otherwise, if at most one of these conditions is met, m is not available to provide service in time period t. The market participant capacity constraints take the form 15 The absolute value terms |p m (t)| in the objective function (2) do not pose any computational difficulty. Because the goal is to minimize this objective function, these absolute value terms can equivalently be represented in terms of linear inequality constraints, as follows. First, introduce new decision variables for the ISO: p a m (t), ∀m ∈ M, t ∈ T. Second, in the objective function (2), replace |p m (t)| by p a m (t), ∀m ∈ M, t ∈ T. Third, include the following additional linear inequality constraints in the constraint set: p a m ≥ p m and p a m ≥ −p m , ∀m ∈ M,t ∈ T. Any solution for the resulting constrained minimization problem will then require p a m (t) = |p m (t)|, ∀m ∈ M,t ∈ T.
Also, the market participant down/up ramp constraints take the form
The terms p m (t) andp m (t) appearing in constraints (18) through (23) are derived values; they give the run-time lower and upper bounds on down/up power availability from market participant m ∈ M in each time period t = 2, . . . , T as a function of the ISO's unit commitment decisions v m (t − 1) and v m (t). To see this, note from (18)- (20) that v m (t) = 0 implies p m (t) = 0 for each t ∈ T. Also, the binary unit commitment vector (v m (t − 1),v m (t)) can take on only one of four possible value combinations for t = 2, . . . , T : namely, (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), or (1, 1) . Given each of these four possible value combinations, it is straightforward to show that constraints (18) through (23) reduce to a distinct set of restrictions on (p m (t),p m (t)) for t = 2, . . . , T , as indicated in Table 1 . 
Finally, it is interesting to note that an "inherent reserve range" can be derived for the power system in each time period t, as a function of the solution for the SC DAM optimization. Define
By construction, the MW amounts RR max (t) and RR min (t) are the maximum and minimum amounts of power available for the system in each time period t during implementation of the SC DAM optimization solution. The Inherent Reserve Range (IRR) for time period t thus takes the form
Size Comparison with Standard DAM SCUC Formulations
As noted in Section 3, two optimizations are undertaken in current U.S. ISO/RTOmanaged DAMs to determine unit commitment, economic dispatch, and pricing solutions: namely, Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) and SecurityConstrained Economic Dispatch (SCED). SCUC is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem and SCED is formulated as a linear programming problem.
Instead of conducting two optimizations, our proposed new SC DAM optimization uses a single optimization process to determine which SCs are cleared, hence which dispatchable market participants are obligated (committed) to ensure service availability for the following day. As seen in Section 5.2, this SC DAM optimization is formulated as an MILP problem.
The sizes of the standard DAM SCUC MILP problem and the SC DAM MILP problem can be approximately measured by the number of integer decision variables and constraints in their problem formulations. To permit direct comparisons, suppose the current day is d and the planning horizon for each problem consists of all 24 hours h of day d+1.
Consider, first, the relative number of integer decision variables. For the DAM SCUC MILP problem, the ISO has 24 integer decision variables (unit commitment indicators) for each market participant m with dispatchable resources, one for each hour h of day d+1. In contrast, for the SC DAM MILP problem, the ISO has one integer decision variable (contract clearing indicator) for each market participant m with dispatchable resources that covers the entire 24 hours of day d+1.
Now consider the relative number of constraints. For the standard DAM SCUC MILP problem, unit commitment restrictions (e.g., start-up/shut-down, minimum down/up time) must be included among the MILP problem constraints. In contrast, for the SC DAM MILP problem, each market participant m is responsible for ensuring the physical feasibility of SC m , its offered swing contract, which requires in particular that all services offered in SC m must satisfy m's unit commitment restrictions. Thus, unit commitment restrictions are implicitly imposed through the forms of the submitted SCs; they do not appear among the MILP problem constraints.
Consequently, measured in terms of integer decision variables and numbers of constraints, the size of the SC DAM optimization formulation is smaller than the size of the standard DAM SCUC optimization formulation, substantially so if the number of dispatchable market participants is large.
Illustrative Example
This section reports illustrative SC DAM optimization findings for a simple power system with three dispatchable GenCos and no transmission congestion. Each GenCo m submits one swing contract SC m to the ISO-managed SC DAM, as depicted in Table 2 . Time periods t are measured in hours, and the net load NL(t) for each hour t of the following day is as depicted in Fig. 5 . The system-wide down/up spinning reserve requirements are set at 10MW below/above net load for each hour t, i.e., RR D (t) = RR U (t) = 10MW for each hour t. The ISO applies an MILP solver to determine an SC DAM optimization solution for the following day, conditional on the three submitted SCs. Simulation results show that the SCs submitted by GenCo 2 and GenCo 3 are cleared: i.e., c m1 = 0, c m2 = 1, and c m3 = 1. The optimal unit commitment v m (t) and dispatch level p m (t) for each GenCo m in each hour t are shown in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively.
The DAM prices for the cleared SCs are their submitted availability prices, and the payments to be received for any actual services performed under these SCs the following day are based on the energy prices specified by the cleared SC performance payment methods: that is, φ m2 = $10/MWh and φ m3 = $20/MWh.
The results show that GenCo 2 serves as base load due to its relatively low performance price, similar to a coal or nuclear plant. The reasons why GenCo 3's submitted SC is also cleared are as follows. First, there is a big ramp-up in net load from hour 15 to hour 16. Due to GenCo 2's limited ramp capability, the maximum available power output for GenCo 2 at hour 16 is 160MW. Thus, GenCo 3 is cleared although it is relatively more expensive. Second, the net load for hour 18 is 210MW, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Table 4 Optimal SC DAM dispatch schedule (MWs) for the illustrative example. Although GenCo 3's available power is not used until hour 16, the unit commitment for GenCo 3 in fact spans from hour 8 to hour 24. The reason for this is that GenCo 's SC commits this GenCo to be available to provide power from hour 8 through hour 24. Thus, if the ISO clears the contract, GenCo 3 must be synchronized to the grid during each of these hours. Figure 6 depicts the inherent reserve range resulting from the cleared SCs for GenCo 2 and GenCo 3, together with the down/up spinning reserve requirements. Note that the inherent reserve range satisfies the down/up spinning reserve requirements while at the same time providing valuable additional flexibility to the ISO for use in real-time balancing operations.
Conclusion
A new mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) optimization formulation has been developed for an ISO-managed day-ahead market (DAM) based on swing contracting that could facilitate the flexible provision and efficient pricing of power and reserve services. A limitation of the current study is that we have not yet implemented and tested our proposed new SC market design for large-scale systems, or for systems involving a DAM and a real-time market (RTM) operating in parallel.
In future work we will extend our SC market design formulation to encompass combined DAM/RTM operations, and we will undertake systematic feasibility and cost comparisons with existing DAM/RTM operations. We will also explore the potential of swing contracts, offered into wholesale power markets by managers of distributed energy resources, to facilitate the integrated operation of transmission and distribution systems.
